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ABSTRACT 
Contemporary nationalism and populism in Europe have been referred as a “powerful cocktail” 
or “the cancer of Europe”. Both nationalism and populism claim to represent the people, if 
nationalism states who is in and out of the people, populism stresses on down and up 
representation, blames illegitimate and corrupted elite by claiming that populists do instead 
represent the people. On the eve of inflow of non-European immigrants and refugees to Europe 
awakening of national sentiments became a good strategy for populists. The paper will provide 
a closer theoretical look at concepts of nationalism and populism and more importantly will 
explore the interplay between populism and nationalism by suggesting the three “the people” 
concept: (1) defining what is/ who is “the people,” (2) building an image of “other” vis-à-vis “the 
people,” and (3) anti-establishment movement against the “other” in the name of “the people.” 
The paper considers later an empirical case of Hungary with its anti-immigrant discourse which 
secured continuation of Orban’s regime until 2022, to discuss closely a “powerful cocktail” of 
nationalism and populism in Hungary. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The high number of non-European immigrants’ inflow into European countries resulted in 
the rise of combination of nationalism and populism, which was labeled as a “powerful 
cocktail”. Both nationalism and populism claim to represent the people. If nationalism states 
who is in and out of the people, populism stresses on down and up representation, by blaming 
the illegitimate and corrupted elite and claiming that populists are the real representatives 
of the people. Thousands of immigrants reaching Europe awakened negative national 
sentiments among the public of recipient countries against non-Europeans. Risen national 
sentiments as practice demonstrates became successful agenda for populists. The paper will 
provide a theoretical look at nationalism and populism and will seek to explore the interplay 
between populism and nationalism. To do so, the paper makes a theoretical review of 
nationalism and populism with an attempt to explain why nationalism and populism if put 
together become a “powerful cocktail.”  
 
NATIONALISM, AS “IN AND OUT THE PEOPLE” DIMENSION   
Despite nationalism is a vague phenomenon and has no universal definition, the paper sticks 
to a very simple definition by Thomas Eriksen which also covers the political aspect of the 
term, according to Eriksen, nationalism is an ideology or “ideological construction” of 
contemporary nation-states (2010).  
Mainstream classic theories of nationalism are primordialism, modernism and ethno-
symbolism. Primordial nationalism, also referred to as organic or nationalist nationalism is 
developed in the works of Anthony Smith (1998). Primordialists suggest, that at all times, 
including pre-modern times organic or natural nations existed. Modernist theories or 
constructivist theories of nationalism in opposition to primordialism, contend that 
nationalism emerged as a response or need to historical developments, such as 
industrialization, modernization, emergence of mass print and literacy (Gellner, 1983; 
Anderson, 2006). Modernists claim that industrialization increased human mobility, and 
thus, created similar economic and political organization that later led to the emergence of a 
new ideology for creating social cohesion – nationalism (Eriksen, 2010). According to Gellner 
nationalism is a “political principle” where national and political units have to be 
harmonizing (1983, 1). Gellner explained nationalism through sentiment and movement: 
“Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. 
Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the 
feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a 
sentiment of this kind” (Ibid.). 
In contrast to Gellner’s interest in nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy, Benedict 
Anderson (2006, 4) studies “emotional legitimacy” of nationalism. In other words, Anderson 
is puzzled to understand the strength and importance of national sentiments and national 
feelings, such as readiness to die for the nation’s well-being, etc. Anderson proposes the 
notion of “imagined community” when defining a nation. He believes that members within 
any community or country can only imagine other community-members as they are not able 
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to get to know, see or meet each other. Therefore, “in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion” (Anderson 2006, 6).  
Finally, ethno-symbolism as its name says focuses on the role of myths, symbols and 
memories in a study of nationalism. Unlike to primordial central claim on the common sense 
of “physical kinship ties”, ethno-symbolic central claim is on the common sense of “cultural 
affinities” (D.Smith, 1998, p. 192). The myth of a common ancestry or kinship ties is crucial 
for ethnic groups, as it records a history of ethnicity, by making it distinctive and justifiable. 
Smith notes that ethnic records were especially crucial for later nation-states, as they sought 
for “a rich and well documented ‘ethno-history’”, “myths of origins”, “golden ages” and 
national heroes to nationalize or re-construct ethno-history (1998, 192).   
Nationalism bifurcates between two opposite groups: voluntarist versus organic or non-
voluntarist, inclusive versus exclusive, moderate versus aggressive, ethnic or genealogical 
versus civic or territorial, Western versus Eastern, etc. Regardless of differences in 
terminology proposed by various scholars, the ideas presented in these terms are similar. 
For instance, voluntarist and organistic or non-voluntarist distinction was made by Hans 
Kohn. He classifies nationalism as voluntarist if society members are free to choose on an 
individual basis and enter a society. Meanwhile, non-voluntarist nationalism does not have a 
freedom of choice, but imposes membership/non-membership to a society based on “fixed 
and indelible character which was stamped on its members at birth and from which they 
could never free themselves” (D.Smith, 1998, p. 146).  Identically,  Rogers Brubaker points 
out two types of nationalism: “civic nationalism, characterized as liberal, voluntarist, 
universalist, and inclusive; and ethnic nationalism, glossed as illiberal, ascriptive, 
particularist, and exclusive” (2004, 133). If the civic nationalism implies common citizenship, 
the ethnic nationalism builds common ethnicity.   
Based on the theoretical explanation of nationalism above, we can assume that 
nationalism as an “ideological construction” and “political principle” defines who is in and 
out the society or the people. In other words, nationalism promoted by a state defines 
membership or non-membership to the society based on linguistic and ethnic or citizenship 
characteristics. Nationalism seeks to use and to reinforce a linkage between a society and a 
state to create an imagined community. If a state creates an imagined community by 
promoting inclusive or liberal policies, the community’s membership is civic or citizenship-
based. Whereas, if a state promotes imagined community through exclusive or illiberal 
policies, the community’s membership is ethnic-based.    
 
POPULISM AS “UP AND DOWN THE PEOPLE” DIMENSION 
Populism similar to nationalism has no universally accepted definition. What is populism is 
still vague and contested in academia: it is defined as an ideology (Mudde, 2004), political 
style (Moffit, 2013), pathology (Mény and Surel, 2002), hybrid regime (Muller, 2016), 
alternative form of political representation (Caramani, 2017), etc.  However, despite many 
approaches in analyzing populism, what is clear is that populists tend to defend the interests 
of the ordinary people against the corrupted and privileged elite. The paper sticks to a 
definition proposed by Mudde, according to him, populism is “an ideology that considers 
society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
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people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of 
the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (2004, 543).  
Populists claim that people’s sovereignty is violated by the constitutional democracy, the 
governments are no longer accountable to its constituency, but to the international 
community.  Populists claim to be the legitimate representatives of the people defending 
their united common interests against the corrupted bureaucratic non-transparent elite or 
the other. As Margaret Canovan noted populism “can have different contents 
depending on the establishment it is mobilizing against” (Canovan, 1999, 4). The core 
legitimating notion for populists is “the people,” which tends to change depending on the 
context. Therefore, she claims populism is not an ideology as it changes depending on 
context. Canovan further elaborates the notion of “the people” and she differentiates three 
forms. The first is appeal to the united people which represents the nation in general and 
which is more integrative. The second is appeal to our people which excludes immigrants, and 
finally appeal to the common people which implies ordinary people against corrupted 
politicians. Another important feature of populism according to her is that it is anti-
establishment mobilization. Populism is an anti-elite phenomenon, as it aims to fight against 
the established status-quo in the name of people (Canovan, 1999). Populists claim that 
political elites are not bothered with what bothers ordinary people.   
A very similar approach was developed by Mény and Surel (2002), they highlight instead 
three key features of populism. First is the importance of “the people,” where an emotion of 
community is emphasized. Both horizontal and vertical divisions are used to exclude certain 
groups, whether elites or immigrants. The second feature that populists state is that “the 
people” were deceived by the corrupted privileged elites. Third, they claim for restoration of 
“primacy of the people,” which means that the populists who are the real representatives of 
the people and their grievances should replace the current elites and serve the people (Ibid, 
13).  
Scholars also studied conditions promoting populism, according to them the most 
mentioned conditions are social or economic crises, problems within political institutions 
(problems within democracy or political representation) and presence of charismatic leaders. 
As it was stated above populism has an ability to unite the people against the corrupted 
privileged elite or other. Social crises or economic and financial crises as practice has shown 
are favorable conditions for populism emergence. Indeed, social unity or cohesion happens 
in extraordinary situations or crises, however, it should be noted that populists tend to use 
extraordinary situation rhetoric in everyday politics.   
According to Canovan, there are problems within political institutions, because there is an 
unavoidable gap between actual performance and the promise of democracy (1999). 
Referring as “two faces of democracy,” Canovan differentiates redemptive and pragmatic 
faces of democracy and concludes that when the system loses its legitimacy populism 
appears. The pragmatic face refers to the mechanisms, the institutions of a democracy, 
whereas the redemptive face points to promises of salvation. Identically, Peter Mair states 
that populism is a result of a broken promise of democracy. According to him, the voters’ 
trust towards the system declines, and the people become detached from the politics, which 
results in a legitimacy or linking gap. The gap he continues, is fulfilled by populists who link 
“depoliticized electorate with a largely neutral and non-partisan system of governance,” as 
parties become centric (Mair, 2002, 84). Finally, in populist politics presence of charismatic 
leaders is key to mobilize people around and to present themselves as real voice of the 
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people. Most of populist leaders tend to present themselves as pure representatives of 
ordinary people, and try to connect themselves with common people. In addition, it is 
important to note that populist leaders could gain their own prominence with the help of 
media (TV, radio and internet) which allowed charismatic leaders to find their own 
supporters. The increased mediatization of politics as Mudde rightly noted could also explain 
why populism became a habitual practice in Western politics (Mudde, 2004).  
Based on the theoretical explanation of populism above, we can conclude that populism is 
an ideology according to which a society is divided into two antagonistic vertical groups – 
corrupted elites and common people. In other words, it represents the “up and down 
dimension” of a society by deciding who has a claim for membership in the up and down 
direction.  Similar to nationalism populism defines membership or non-membership to “the 
people” based on the presence of pure public representation and pure public interests. 
Populists seek to use a legitimacy gap between “the common people” and “corrupted elite,” 
and to serve as alternative true linkage between the two sides.  
 
WHY COMBINATION OF NATIONALISM AND POPULISM IS A “POWERFUL COCKTAIL”?  
In contemporary politics of European countries, populism is on a rise as a reaction to inflow 
of high number of non-Europeans. Especially, a combination of nationalism and populism, a 
so-called “powerful cocktail” becomes a modern-day trend, which deserves a special 
attention. As theoretical examination above stated both nationalism and populism claim to 
represent “the people” - a core idea of democracy. If nationalism states who is in and out of 
the people, by including or excluding particular groups (ethnicities, gender, etc.), populism 
stresses on down and up representation, by blaming illegitimate and corrupted elite and 
claiming that populists are real representatives of the people.  
Why is a combination of nationalism and populism a “powerful cocktail”? A possible 
answer to the posed question lies within the three “the people” concept. As it was mentioned 
above, populists first, identify what is/who is “the people,” they try to create a homogenous 
society by excluding non-members and unite members.  Second, populists construct an image 
of the “other” or “enemy” against “the people.” The “other” is here key and decisive, which 
defines a context, as Canovan rightly noted. Depending on populists’ agenda, the “other” can 
be an individual politician, the entire political leadership, businessmen, transnational 
corporations, foreign financial institutions or immigrants. Finally, in the third stage populists 
claim to fight against the “other” as anti-establishment movement in the name of “the people.”  
Building an image of the “other” (the second stage) is a phase when nationalism 
intervenes. Populists construct immigrants as “other” vis-à-vis “the people.” Thousands of 
immigrants reaching Europe awakened negative national sentiments among the public of 
recipient countries against non-Europeans, to which media  also contributed. Risen national 
sentiments as practice demonstrates became a winning agenda for populists to mobilize 
people around its charismatic leaders (the United Kingdom Independence Party, the National 
Front, the Alternative für Deutschland, Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség etc.). Therefore, 
most of contemporary populist movements in Europe and the rest of the world tend to use a 
successful duet of nationalism and populism. It should be noted that the combination of 
nationalism and populism is also a dangerous “cocktail,” because when “the people” is 
considered through the lenses of a specific culture or race, it can easily grow into racism.  
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Finally, it can be added that the immigrant inflow to Europe is also presented as a social crisis 
or extraordinary situation, which is theoretically is one of conditions driving to the rise of 
populism. As suggested by a recent study, social crises, in particular economic or financial 
crises contribute to tensions between the Europeans and immigrants, which is used 
opportunistically by populist charismatic leaders to mobilize people around themselves in 
everyday politics (Yann Algan, 2017).   
  
NATIONALISM AND POPULISM IN ACTION: A HUNGARIAN CASE 
In this part of the paper, a Hungarian example of combination of nationalism and populism 
is discussed through suggested in this study the three “the people” concept: (1) defining what 
is/ who is “the people,” (2) building an image of “other” or “enemy” vis-à-vis “the people,” 
and (3) anti-establishment movement against the “other” in the name of “the people.”  The 
concept of the three “the people” is as elaborated above is a key concept explaining a powerful 
formula of nationalism and populism. The analysis and discussion below is based merely on 
information provided by key foreign media sources.     
In Hungary, since the refugee crisis of 2015, anti-immigrant rhetoric became a top-priority 
political agenda under Viktor Orban’s authoritarian leadership. He succeeded to build a fence 
along Hungary’s borders with the Baltic States to block immigrants flow mainly from non-
European countries. Moreover, this rhetoric became a successful electoral campaign strategy 
for the Hungarian Prime Minister to sustain longer in power. In April of 2018, the electoral 
victory (133 out of 199 seats in the Parliament) of ruling Fidesz party in alliance with the 
Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) secured for Orban the fourth term of Prime 
Ministry in Hungary until 2022. The Guardian notes that Fidesz won April 2018 
parliamentary elections “exclusively on the threat posed to Hungary by migration.” The 
Guardian continues that, in a closing campaign speech prior the parliamentary elections day, 
Orban warned, “If they open the borders, if migrants enter the country, there is no way back.” 
Orban’s anti-immigration posters during his party’s agitation campaign were widely 
displayed around Budapest and the entire country in general, including in social media 
(Facebook). In 2018, after re-election, Orban publicly announced establishment of the 
“Christian democracy” in Hungary shaped by European traditions. The “Christian 
democracy” introduced by Orban as its name stands for, obviously would serve to solely 
Christian culture ignoring or non-tolerating other cultures living in Hungary. Based on this 
statement, in Hungary “the people” could be defined as a community consisting of a Christian 
culture. Contemporary understanding and the imagination of “the people” in Hungary is 
presented by the government as a merely Christian society which does not accommodate 
other cultures or values. Thus, it could be noted that in the contemporary Hungarian context, 
the concept “the people” is presented in a more exclusive rather than inclusive manner.  
The ruling leadership in Hungary succeeded to create several enemy-images linked to each 
other. According to Orban’s rhetoric, the “other”/ “enemy” vis-à-vis “the people” in Hungary, 
are non-European immigrants threatening Christian culture, European values and traditions. 
Another institutional “enemy” of “the people” is non-governmental organizations funded by 
George Soros, in particular Open Society Foundations, which is accused for actively 
encouraging immigration and supporting refugees. Finally, another the “other” vis-à-vis “the 
people” are supra-national businesses and institutions, including Brussels (the European 
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Union) sympathizing to non-European immigration and supporting refugees from non-
European countries. These enemy-images are built mainly around non-European 
immigration issue, as a response to refugee crisis in Europe since 2015. Therefore, it can be 
stated that in Hungary a contemporary central “other”/ “enemy” vis-à-vis “the people” is non-
European culture threatening to European and Christian culture.   
As a counter-activity or anti-establishment movement against the “other” in the name of 
“the people,” Orban’s government is about to adopt a “stop-Soros” law in the Parliament 
which introduces high taxation (25% increase) towards NGOs that support immigration. This 
initiative, in general is expected to limit civil society’s activities in the country. It is widely 
campaigned by Orban that Soros has a conspiracy for fall of Hungary by interfering into its 
domestic affairs, despite Soros’s Open Society Foundations in Hungary have played a key role 
in fall of Communism since 1984 and independence of Hungary, by supporting youth through 
education scholarships. To note, Viktor Orban himself benefited from Soros’s education 
scholarship program prior the Communism’s collapse in Hungary. Another ambitious 
counter-activity or anti-establishment movement the populist leadership now tries to take 
up is building a like-minded anti-immigrant block around Hungary, which would eventually 
include Poland, Slovakia and other smaller European countries, to counter-balance France 
and Germany. In the first victorious speech in April 2018, Orban stressed that Hungary will 
be defended by him and his government against the constructed “other.” The Hungarian 
example suggests that constructing the “other” vis-à-vis “the people,” and the combination of 
nationalism with populism in general is often a successful combination for illiberal, 
authoritarian and corrupted political regimes’ durability.        
 
CONCLUSION 
Both nationalism and populism claim to represent “the people” - a core idea of democracy. If 
nationalism states who is in and out of the people, by including or excluding particular groups 
(ethnicities, gender, etc.), populism stresses on down and up representation, by blaming the 
illegitimate and corrupted elite and claiming that populists are the real representatives of the 
people. A possible answer to the posed question lies within the concept “the people”: (1) 
defining what is/ who is “the people,” (2) building an image of the “other” vis-à-vis “the 
people,” and (3) anti-establishment movement against the “other” in the name of “the 
people.” The paper later considered the empirical case of populist nationalist leadership of 
Hungary. Namely, the Hungarian case was discussed though the three “the people” concept 
suggested by the paper to discuss closely a “powerful cocktail” of nationalism and populism.  
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